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Abstract 
Globalization and more open economies has over the last two decades led to an increase of 
FDI which has been argued to lead to economic growth. So far economists are not unanimous 
on to what extent or fully agreed upon if certain other conditions have to be fulfilled for this 
to be true. In newer research on economic development scientists emphasize the importance 
of institutions for economic growth. The interaction between institutions and other variables 
affecting economic growth has become more important to understand, especially in 
developing countries. 
This thesis is examining if FDI affect economic growth in developing countries and if there is 
an interaction between FDI and corruption affecting economic growth. Knowing how 
institutions affect development will make it easier to know which measures that needs to be 
taken to achieve better conditions for economic growth. The focus and research questions are 
following: 
 Does FDI affect economic growth in developing countries? 
 Is there an interaction effect between FDI and informal institutions affecting economic 
growth? 
One key finding is that FDI have a positive effect on economic growth. Additionally, when a 
possible interaction effect between FDI inflow and corruption is taken into consideration, no 
significant results are found. As this thesis however only covers developing countries a higher 
significance level can be argued to be tolerated, and two trends have been found: higher levels 
of corruption make FDI have a less positive effect on economic growth, and the more FDI a 
country receive, the worse corruption is for economic growth. The area can and should be 
explored further and more research is needed before any stronger conclusions can be made. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization and more open economies has over the last two decades led to an increase of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and research that has shown that FDI can to lead to economic 
growth, it is however important to mention that economists are not unanimous on to what 
extent or fully agreed upon if certain conditions within a country have to be fulfilled for this 
to be true. The majority of FDI inflows are today received by developed countries. 
Graph 1. Inflow of FDI 
 
Source: The World Bank (2014) 
Economists have tried to connect successful FDI to certain determinants within countries, 
which appears to be easier to do in developed countries where data is both more accessible 
and more reliable. This has also contributed to the fact that there is more research on the area 
regarding just developed countries. In developing countries the determinants are harder to 
find, but in recent studies on economic growth scientists have emphasized the importance of 
institutions. The process where formal institutions, such as an enforced legal system, and 
informal institutions, such as social norms and values, work together towards creating a good 
climate for economic development has become more important to understand, especially in 
developing countries where the need to achieve higher living standards is greater. So far many 
different results have been reached but agreed upon is that more research is needed. 
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The connection between FDI and institutions is interesting to examine as there is a relatively 
small amount of research on the area, especially handling a larger number of developing 
countries. FDI is in many developing countries seen as a good and generally safe option to 
finance investments when the national savings are insufficient, if a negative link between 
weak institutions and FDI inflow could be found it would create an incentive for governments 
worldwide to work towards good governance policies. 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this bachelor thesis is to examine if FDI affect economic growth in developing 
countries and if informal institutions have an effect on the outcome. Knowing how institutions 
affect economic growth and how they interact with other variables affecting economic growth 
will make it easier to know which measures that needs to be taken to achieve better conditions 
for development. 
The focus and research questions are thus following: 
 Does FDI affect economic growth in developing countries? 
 Is there an interaction effect between FDI and informal institutions affecting economic 
growth? 
1.2 Method and delimitation 
The thesis will start with a theoretical part explaining economic growth and then move on to 
previous research related to the area. The method chosen to examine the research questions is 
to econometrically analyze different regressions on economic growth using panel data 
covering a larger number of developing countries over a period of 12 years. Informal 
institutions is a wide area, this thesis will focus on the institution of corruption as it is a big 
problem in many developing countries and an obstacle for efficient international interactions. 
1.3 Chapters 
Chapter 2 defines the concepts of developing countries, FDI, institutions, and corruption, 
which are important throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 covers economic growth theory and the 
outlines of the Solow model to help motivate variables in the regression analysis. Chapter 4 
covers previous research to increase the understanding and the complexity of the area. 
Chapter 5 goes through the method and material used in the study as well as discuss 
difficulties with certain variables. Chapter 6 presents results and chapter 7 discusses the 
findings and presents conclusions.  
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2. Definitions 
2.1 Developing country 
Generally a developing country is a country with lower living standards and an outdated 
technology. There is no universally agreed upon definition of a developing country, in this 
thesis developing countries will be defined by the World Bank where some of the 
characteristics are: 
 outdated technology 
 poor health- and education systems 
 a big part of the population in rural areas 
 weak infrastructure 
 fragile government due to an unsustainable debt, armed conflicts, or weak institutions. 
(The World Bank, 2014) 
2.2 Foreign direct investment 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) definition of FDI 
will be used throughout this thesis, thus a cross-border investment where the investor’s 
intention is to maintain the relationship with the enterprise over a longer period of time while 
having significant influence over management, production, and decision making. The 
standard criteria is that the investor has ownership of at least 10% of the company. FDI is an 
important component for international integration as it generates long lasting and stable links 
between countries. It also encourages transfer of technology and know-how which makes it 
easier for developing countries to reach international markets. (OECD, 2014). 
2.3 Institution 
Institutions is a broad concept, it has many definitions and takes place through established 
organizations, buildings, costumes, practices, and rules. An institution is any structure of 
social order governing the behavior of individuals of a certain group. Institutions varies 
between countries and are commonly divided into formal and informal institutions, although 
they are often intertwined. The definition for formal institutions is observable rules, e.g. 
written documents, contracts, or rules. The definition of informal institutions is rules based on 
implicit understanding. They are not treated in written documents but part of the society 
through social norms, routines, traditions, political processes, and culture. Institutions hold an 
important role in societies as they make economic interactions more predictable. Formal 
institutions have historically been used to make markets function better, scientists have 
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however recently gotten more interested in the interaction between formal and informal 
institutions and institutional economics has become a big area of research. Institutional 
economics explains how individuals interact and coordinate their transactions through 
institutions (Groenewegen et al. 2010, 13). 
Each country has its own institutional environment that consists of a set of rules that can be 
either values, norms, conventions, or laws. Values in a society explains what is considered to 
be good or bad and is embedded in the culture and shared by all, or almost all, citizens. All 
aspects of human behavior that are generally held are considered values, e.g. opinions about 
freedom, justice, security, peace, or life goals. Norms explains how individuals behave in 
order to achieve their values, they are thus generally held opinions on how to act in a society. 
Many norms are however not thought about actively. Conventions structure behavior through 
practical rules in more complex and specific situations. A good example is that if a value in a 
society is safety, this is partly achieved through the norms of driving safely, which will be 
regulated in the convention of driving on the right or left side of the road. Values, norms, and 
conventions are informal institution and even though generally held, opposing opinions can 
exist. In those cases informal institutions do not structure the behavior of individuals 
sufficiently and formal institutions are needed. Laws are rules set by the government. The 
breaking of a law have consequences in form of sanctions such as fines or jail sentences. 
Laws often gets enacted to support a norm or convention. The norm of solidarity, even though 
commonly agreed upon, often needs to be supported through example tax laws (Groenewegen 
et al. 2010, 25). 
2.4 Corruption 
Corruption, in the meaning of abuse of entrusted power for personal gain is a type of informal 
institution. Corruption has over recent years been more frequently discussed. Media focuses 
attention on corruption scandals, governments and other institutions have taken action to fight 
corruption, and the amount of academic research on the area has increased rapidly. The major 
concerns of corruption are the lack of trust in politicians and political structures, that it creates 
barriers in international trade, and problems to support developing countries. In larger forums, 
such as the World Bank, corruption is seen as one of the biggest obstacles to both economic 
and social development (Andersson and Heywood, 2009). 
Fighting corruption is a difficult process as there are many different types of corruption 
activities occurring in many different sectors of a society. It is clear that small scale 
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corruption, such as the bribing of a police officer for a minor traffic offence, cannot be fought 
the same way as big scale corruption crimes, such as a politician’s embezzlement of public 
funds. Many governments have followed the World Bank’s strategies to fight corruption, i.e. 
implementing an institutional design called good governance. The World Bank means that 
anticorruption strategies should reduce opportunities for corruption and increase 
consequences of the crime. Good governance, in the meaning of being transparent, consensus 
oriented, accountable, participatory, efficient, inclusive, and law-following, has also been 
shown to have great importance for development. Good governance tackle corruption mainly 
through improving political accountability and strengthening the civil society. (Andersson and 
Heywood, 2009). 
 
3. Theory 
3.1 Economic growth 
Economic growth, as an increase of an economy’s capacity to produce goods and services 
from one period to another, is a big area for research and there are many theories and models 
related to the area. The gross domestic product (GDP) or GDP per capita is used to measure 
economic growth, which makes it easy to compare economic activity between countries. 
The long run economic growth is the most important when measuring an economy’s 
performance and economic development. According to Bradford DeLong (1999), successful 
economic growth leads to a higher material standard of living for the population as well as 
higher economic productivity. The primary determinants of economic growth are technology 
advances and capital intensity, different policies and initial conditions within countries can 
however take part in accelerating or slowing down the process. (Bradford DeLong 1999, ch. 
4.) 
Technology advances makes labor more efficient, in the meaning of labor force attaining 
better education, higher skills, and the ability to handle new technology. An economy that 
becomes more efficient will consequently also become more productive. Capital intensity, as 
the second major determinant of economic growth, is a measure of how much capital goods 
the average worker have at his or her disposal. Capital goods are among others buildings, 
freeways, docks, vehicles, cranes, machines, tools, and computers. When an economy 
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becomes more capital intense it will also become more productive. (Bradford DeLong 1999, 
ch. 4.) 
Policies for economic growth within a country can affect how much both the technology and 
the capital intensity affect economic growth. Foremost two factors determines the capital 
intensity’s effect on economic development. The first one is the investment effort, thus the 
share of the total production in an economy that is being saved and invested for the purpose of 
increasing the capital stock of buildings, infrastructure, machines, and tools to increase the 
productivity of the workers. Policies within a country that generate a higher level of 
investment effort lead to a faster long run economic growth. The second factor is the 
investment requirements, thus the amount of investment that goes to preparing new workers 
or replacing old buildings, machines, or other tools. (Bradford DeLong 1999, ch. 4.) 
3.2 The Solow model 
The information in following section is based on Jones and Vollrath’s Introduction to 
economic growth (2013) chapter 2. 
The standard model for economic growth is the Solow model. Using the model economists 
find an equilibrium to which the model will converge over time, looking at economic growth 
the equilibrium economists are interested in are the steady-state balanced-growth equilibrium. 
The equilibrium is determined by analyzing five factors: the efficiency level of labor, the 
economy’s population growth rate, the efficiency of labor’s growth rate, the economy’s 
savings rate, and the depreciation rate of the capital stock. 
The production function explains the relationship between the resources in an economy and 
how they can be used, which determines the economy’s output. The economy’s resources are 
the labor force, the capital stock, and the level of technology. Together they determine the 
economy’s efficiency of labor. The output of an economy can be used for either investment, 
which accumulates capital and moves the steady state, or consumption. The Cobb-Douglas 
production function is commonly used to explain the relationship: 
Equation 1. 
Y/L = (K/L)α • E1-α 
Where the real GDP divided by the number of workers, (Y/L), is equal to the capital stock per 
worker, (K/L), raised to the exponential power of a number, (α), multiplied with the labor 
efficiency, (E), determined by the economy’s technology level raised to the exponential 
11 
 
power of a number, (1- α), where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The Cobb-Douglas production function is useful 
as it can model many different scenarios. It is however like any economic model abstract, but 
economists agree that it is correct enough to provide approximately correct conclusions on 
how the economy will behave. 
After the production function the Solow model consists of three assumptions where all 
variables in the functions are time subscripted as they are assumed to change over time. The 
model’s assumption about the growth of the labor force is that the labor force, L, is growing at 
a constant proportional rate, n, which is shown in the equation below. 
Equation 2. 
Lt+1 = (1 + n) • Lt 
The model’s assumption about the efficiency of labor, E, is that it is growing at a constant 
proportional rate, g. 
Equation 3. 
Et+1 = (1 + g) • Et 
The last assumption in the model is that a savings rate s of the real GDP will be saved and 
invested every year, which makes the accumulation of capital endogenous. Savings is the 
difference between income and consumption and add to the capital stock through investments. 
The capital stock does however not grow by the full size of the investment as the capital stock 
depreciate by the rate of δ every year. Thus to calculate next year’s capital stock following 
equation is used: 
Equation 4. 
Kt+1 = K1 + (s • Yt) – (δ • Kt) 
When the amount of investment is bigger than the amount of depreciated capital, the capital 
stock will increase, thus moving the steady state. The capital stock will rise until investments 
are equal to depreciated capital and the change in capital from year to year is 0, at this point 
the economy is on its steady state. When the economy is not on its steady state it will move 
towards it. In equilibrium the economy’s capital stock and level of real GDP are growing at 
the same proportional rate making the capital-output ratio constant. 
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To summarize it, there are two key concepts in the Solow model. The first one states that 
countries with a high investment rate have a higher capital-output ratio and thus grows as the 
steady state increases. The second concept states that countries further away from its steady 
state grow faster, and explains why countries have different growth rates. 
Countries continue to grow over time which suggest that capital accumulation not is, or at 
least not in itself, a key determinant for long run economic growth. The Solow model has 
empirically been shown to better model short term economic growth. 
 
4. Previous research 
4.1 FDI and economic growth 
The connection between economic integration and economic development is a big area of 
research. Globalization and more open economies has over the last decades led to an increase 
of FDI, and the link between received FDI and economic growth has interested many. Over 
the last two decades a lot of research has shown that FDI can lead to economic growth, 
scientists are however not unanimous on to what extent or fully agreed upon if certain 
conditions within countries have to be fulfilled for this to be true (Hofmann 2013). 
In the early approaches to explain FDI and its consequences FDI was only seen as a second 
capital input factor. Shortly however, scientists additionally found it to be an important source 
for development under the right policy environment, this through the understanding and 
incorporation of new technology and know-how such as applying modern management and 
organizational practices. The effects that are not purely financial are called spillover effects. 
When a multinational company (MNC) build factories or set up production plants spillover 
effects are likely to come along as the MNC will use the most efficient ways to structure 
production. As MNCs often aim to be integrated in the local environment, needing 
transportation or access to key infrastructure to be able to operate in the new country, linkages 
with local firms are common and thus know-how and technology transfers reach whole 
sectors and not just workers within the MNC (Hofmann 2013). 
Although no general consensus has been reached on how FDI affect economic growth, the 
growing interpretation is that FDI is positively correlated with growth, with the major support 
that FDI through improvement in technology, efficiency, and productivity is stimulating 
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economic growth. FDI also leads to higher level of competition through the presence of 
MNC’s, forcing local businesses to plan and to use their resources more carefully or focus 
more on education to remain on the market (Lall 1980). Empirical evidence of these FDI 
efficiency spillovers has been found, but no strong consensus on to what degree (Blomstrom, 
et al. 2000). 
4.1.1. Determinants of FDI inflow and FDI spillover effects 
The biggest problem in deciding which the true determinants are regarding successful FDI 
and its spillover effects is that data can be hard to acquire and that it often is more 
deteminants working together that achieve a positive result. Some of the more commonly 
mentioned determinants on however FDI will be successful are the host country’s level of 
openness, market size, labor costs, tax rates, inflation rates, and political climate. 
A higher level of openness is more likely to attract export oriented foreign investors. This has 
been shown by Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) who suggest that a country with more liberal 
trade regulation and better connections to global markets is more preferable for investors. 
They additionally mean that countries with more limitations to trade meet higher transaction 
costs regarding export to international markets which discourage export oriented investors. 
For investors more interested in working within the host country however, the domestic 
market size and the GDP per capita will be more important than the level of openness, Artige 
and Nicolini (2006) mean that the domestic market size is the main determinant of FDI inflow 
in a country. The positive relationship between a bigger domestic market, higher GDP per 
capita, and FDI inflow has been easier to show in developed countries. Asiedu (2002) agrees 
and means that markets with higher purchasing power consequently becomes more attractive 
as the possibility for higher revenues increases. 
A country’s production and labor costs also affect the inflow of FDI. Wages, technology 
level, infrastructure, and raw material prices are carefully evaluated by possible investors. 
Low wages and low raw material prices lower production costs and consequently makes 
investing more attractive. That lower wages leads to a bigger inflow of FDI has been showed 
by Botric and Škuflic (2006). 
A country’s tax rates has also been argued to affect the inflow of FDI. The lowering of 
corporate taxes is a popular incentive for countries to attract foreign investors. There are 
numerous studies with results showing both positive and negative results on this relationship 
and no consensus has been reached. (Demirhan and Masca, 2008). 
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A country’s inflation rate is a good indicator on how the country works on a macro level, high 
levels of inflation could mean instable conditions for an investor. High inflation rates has a 
negative effect on FDI inflow as it reduces the size of an investment, which has been showed 
by Azam (2010). 
The political environment in a country also affects FDI inflows. High political risks has in 
recent studies been shown to have a negative impact on FDI inflows. Investors will hesitate to 
invest in a country with high political risk as it is realistic to assume that such conditions 
would affect production negatively (Krifa-Schneider and Matei, 2010). 
Regarding the size of the FDI spillover effects the biggest determinant appears to be how big 
the technology gap between the countries are and what ability the host country have to use the 
new technology. There are studies showing that local firms will become more productive with 
the presence of foreign business, when the technology of the host country is not be too far 
behind. When the technology gap is too big spillover effects are harder to identify. This has 
been shown for example with FDI connected to oil or natural resources, where in some 
extreme cases the only effect from FDI is the generating of more income for a small part of 
the population through the new work opportunities (Imbriani and Reganati 1997 , and Kokko 
et al. 1996). 
4.1.2 FDI in developing countries 
Attracting FDI can be argued to be more important for developing countries than for 
developed countries as national savings in developing countries are not as big and sometimes 
not big enough to finance essential investments. FDI is seen as a good option for additional 
finance connected with low risks. (Demirhan and Masca, 2008.) 
Developing countries have different obstacles to overcome in order to get the attention of 
foreign investors. Weak infrastructure, political risks, and the absence of working institutions 
are some of the more frequently discussed problems. (ODI, 2014.) 
A stable and working infrastructure is essential for companies to operate within a country. 
The infrastructure includes many dimensions and is a wide term, the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) (2014) defines infrastructure as basic physical and organizational structures 
that provides a framework required for a country to function. Functioning airports, ports, 
water supplies, roads, electricity, and communication devices are essential for foreign 
investors. Scott and Prachi (2012) means that the lack of a stable infrastructure is the biggest 
obstacle in developing countries for foreign investments and economic growth. 
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Another problem brought to surface by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF-GATI) (2014) 
is that developing countries who seek investors not always have the opportunity to choose 
where the money come from. Advances in electronic communication and the increase of 
international money transfers create together with weak financial regulations, undependable 
law enforcements, and weak institutions an attractive location for criminal organizations, 
something that is undesirable and in the long run could have negative impacts on economic 
growth. (FATF-GATI, 2014.) 
The political risk in a country has been shown to affect FDI inflows especially in developing 
countries as it is connected with a risk of change in the conditions for companies to operate 
(Butler and Joaquin, 1998). Investments behavior is partly controlled by the risk connected to 
the investment. This relationship has been shown by Jun and Singh (1996) who conclude that 
developing countries with higher political risk attract less FDI. Internal and external conflict, 
such as civil unrest, riots, high criminality, cross-border conflicts, trade sanctions, and wars 
have been shown to reduce the inflow of FDI. The political risks consists of components 
closely linked to the quality of political institutions and good governance. The institutional 
strength of a country affects everything from the quality of the bureaucracy to law and order 
enforcement (Kaufmann et al., 1999). 
4.2 Institutions and economic growth 
Growth literature has changed substantially over the last two decades. The relationship 
between institutions and economic growth has become a big area of research. The renewed 
interest in explaining economic growth has in some extent been politically driven, where 
some economists, like North (1989), argue that the traditional models do not incorporate all 
contributing growth factors. He further criticize that no space within the models is given to 
the role of institutions. Bassanini et al. (2001) have also discussed the importance of 
institutions and developed new models that allow the level of efficiency to be related to the 
institutional settings within a country, but because of the intertwined effects the models are 
less suited for empirical studies. 
North (1989) started emphasizing the importance of institutions in the late 1980’s. Institutions 
set the conditions for contracts to be followed, for property rights to be enforced, and creates a 
willingness to decline opportunities to engage in opportunistic behavior. Norms play a central 
role in the decision making process, something that is not often incorporated in the normal 
neoclassical wealth maximizing assumption. 
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North (1989) also concludes that there is a difference between developed and developing 
countries. Government’s embodying of legal institutions is a process which has proceeded 
longer in developed countries, which is connected to social values and norms. Studies have 
shown that the price individuals are willing to pay for convictions and the breaking of rules is 
a negatively sloped function, institutions and ideological attitudes matter less as the gains 
increase. For people in developing countries the gains of breaking a law and not getting 
caught are higher than for people in developed countries breaking the same law. (North, 
1989.) 
North (1989) suggests that the neoclassical model is misleading. He means that the output of 
an economy is a function of the traditional inputs, seen in for instance the Solow model, as 
well as the cost of transacting, thus how institutions work together. One argument he uses to 
support this is to refer to institutions such as enforcements of property rights which has been 
shown to lead to economic growth through an increase of productivity. The measuring of 
transaction costs is difficult, some aspects can be measured in the market economy while 
other, such as costs from waiting in queue or costs from bribery, remain unmeasured even 
though they hold an important role in societies. It is however easy to understand that there are 
costs connected to these norms, e.g. when an investor tries to do business in another country 
and has to learn how things are done there. The interaction between people are different in 
different countries, once the norms are understood exchanges of social, political, and 
economic kind can be made more efficiently. One of the main function of institutions is to 
provide certainty to human interaction (North, 1989). 
4.2.1 The effects of institutions 
Economists have had problems confirming and quantifying relationships between institutional 
settings and economic growth with normal economic growth regressions. A key factor for 
growth has during recent years been explained by the adaptation of new technology, where 
policies and institutions set the conditions by influencing the markets ability to adapt. The 
markets ability to change, thus reallocate resources, reforming existing firms, and discovering 
new business opportunities, is essential for development. Institutional settings has been shown 
to be a big reason as to why some countries adapt quicker while other fall behind. (Bassanini 
et al., 2001.) 
Regarding investments Bassanini et al. (2001) suggest that different policies and institutions 
affect both the size of investments and the size of the impact investments have on economic 
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growth. By setting the conditions for investments institutions consequently control 
investments in many areas. Human capital and education is one area contributing to higher 
efficiency and thus economic growth. Investments in human capital, such as education 
systems, are often seen as contributor to efficiency of production through higher skills and 
knowledge of the labor force. The education level has however also a strong relationship with 
the technological progress within a country, thus, in addition to education’s effect on the labor 
force work skills, it will also contribute to economic growth through technological progress 
and innovation in the right institutional settings. Institutions also set the conditions for 
research within a country. Governmental involvement through both direct funding and 
indirect measures such as tax incentives and protection of intellectual property rights has been 
shown to affect economic growth positively. (Bassanini et al., 2001.) 
Many OECD countries have since the 1990’s benefitted from a more stable inflation rate, thus 
lower uncertainty, and it has been argued that the institutional environment is a major reason 
for this. Many developed countries have had an increasing growth rate, which has been shown 
to be due to a more stable inflation rate. (Bassanini et al., 2001.) 
4.3 Institutions and FDI 
Regarding FDI only a relatively small amount of attention has been given to the area of 
institutions. In the beginning of the 1990’s economists started doing international cross-
country studies where they tried to determine the influence of policy related variables on FDI 
inflows. Positive relationships between FDI inflow and countries with strong intellectual 
property protection (Lee and Mansfield, 1996) as well as countries with a tradition of contract 
enforcement (Gastanaga et al. 1998) were found. Negative relationship between investments 
and weak administrative institutions were also found (Brunetti and Weder, 1998). 
Jensen (2003) has analyzed the relationship between fundamental democratic rights and the 
inflow of FDI. He found support for a higher level of FDI inflow in democratic countries. He 
also argues that there is another linkage to be considered, namely that democratic rights lead 
to improved property protection which in turn has been shown to affect FDI. The way 
institutions interact and affect each other is complex and due to casualty it is hard to 
determine the real cause of an effect and even harder to quantify it.  
4.4 Corruption and FDI 
Corruption is generally associated with negative effects on a society. Gastanaga et al. (1998) 
showed a negative relationship between corruption and FDI inflows. Their study did however 
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only cover 22 developing countries which makes it hard to draw any general conclusions, and 
they state that their finding may not always apply. 
Newer research have also found a positive linkage between corruption and FDI inflow (Egger 
and Winner, 2005). The study was done on 73 countries over 5 years of time, with the 
majority being developed countries. The key finding was that corruption, in countries with 
excessive regulations and administrative controls, could encourage FDI inflow as investors 
through bribes or similar activities quicker got permissions and access to markets. 
4.5 Summarizing central research 
The increase of FDI has led to many new areas of research. It has been shown that FDI can 
lead to economic growth, and focus has been on finding determinants for inflow and for when 
it is successful. In developing countries the biggest obstacles for attracting FDI are weak 
infrastructure, political risks, and the absence of working institutions. The traditional growth 
model has been argued to be insufficient as it does not incorporate institutional settings within 
countries. Regarding FDI and institutions, research has shown a positive relationship between 
FDI inflow and strong intellectual property protection as well as a negative relationship 
between FDI inflow and weak administrative institutions. 
There is not much research on corruption and FDI, and none on their combined impact on 
economic growth. It has been shown that corruption can be negative for FDI inflows, but also 
the opposite relationship has been found. Economists have not examined the interaction 
between FDI and corruption, and connecting areas lack results on a larger number of 
developing countries which makes the research questions in this thesis highly relevant. 
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5. Method and material 
5.1 Model development 
Using econometrics to examine the research questions the first step is to find the true model 
for the economic growth regressions. The problem with finding the true model is that 
economists have not yet agreed upon a model and which variables that actually affect 
economic growth. There are however variables that are more often used than others, the 
variables initial GDP per capita, population growth, savings and investments, inflation, 
human capital, level of openness, and infrastructure have been subject to many studies 
regarding economic growth. Below follows support as to why these variables have been 
chosen to model economic growth in this thesis. 
5.1.1 The variables 
Initial GDP per capita is commonly used in studies on economic growth. According to Solow 
the growth rate of poor countries, thus having a low initial GDP per capita, is quicker because 
they are further away from their steady state. Barro (2003) found the variable valuable in 
economic growth regressions and empiric evidence supporting Solow’s theory. The expected 
sign for this variable is thus negative. 
Population growth has in early economic growth literature been argued to have little effect on 
economic growth. In the 1980’s however many scientists concluded that population growth 
has a significant positive effect on economic growth. Economists have also found empiric 
evidence saying that a declining population growth in OECD countries appears to slow 
economic growth. Later research however states that the relationship could be the opposite in 
developing countries depending on demographic conditions within a country (Headey and 
Hodge, 2009). As studies have shown different results it is hard to expect a certain sign, it 
should however be controlled for. 
Studies on the relationship between saving and investment rates and economic growth has 
shown that higher saving rates lead to faster economic growth (Carroll and Weil, 1994). The 
findings are consistent with Solow’s model where higher savings lead to a higher level of 
GDP per capita in the steady state and thus to economic growth. The expected sign for this 
variable is thus positive. 
Barro (1995) found that the relationship between economic growth and inflation is important 
to take into consideration in economic growth regressions, he found significant results 
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showing that high rates of inflation reduce real economic growth which also is consistent with 
the Solow model. Expected sign is thus negative. 
Human capital is also part of the Solow model and frequently mentioned in economic growth 
studies. Barro (1991) has found empiric evidence that human capital has a positive effect on 
economic growth. With this realization many countries have tried to efficiently measure their 
human capital to be able to understand their current state and develop methods to improve it. 
For measuring human capital another tool is needed and commonly used is education. 
Education can be measured as everything from literacy rates to amount of population going to 
university, used in this thesis is secondary school enrollment. The choice was made to get the 
best reflection of the countries level of human capital where differences could be seen. School 
enrollment is in many countries mandatory which would overestimate a country’s human 
capital while university studies would underestimate it, neither giving a fair reflection. The 
measure of secondary school enrollment has however also drawbacks as the effectiveness of 
one person cannot be determined only by the number of school years (Kwon, 2009). The 
expected sign for this variable is positive. 
A country’s degree of openness has been subject to many studies regarding economic growth 
where higher growth rates often are connected to more open countries with good linkages to 
international markets. Participation on international markets is often seen as a primary source 
of economic growth and countries that embrace the ongoing globalization grow faster 
(Andersen and Babula, 2008). In this thesis the Heritage Foundation’s measurement freedom 
to trade will be used, it is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
affecting international trade. The index is based on data from reputable international 
institutions interested in trade (the Heritage Foundation, 2014). The sign is expected to be 
positive. 
A country’s level of infrastructure has been discussed as a reason for economic growth as the 
infrastructure in a country sets the condition for economic activities. Canning and Pedroni 
(2004) have found empiric evidence that infrastructure promotes long run economic growth in 
the absolute majority of countries. When measuring the level of infrastructure another tool is 
needed, used in this thesis is number of mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people. Research 
on economic growth often use number of mobile phones per 100 people, share of paved roads, 
or expansion of railway network to measure the level of infrastructure. The drawback of this 
approach is that many studies have a broad definition of infrastructure and the usage if a 
single tool will not give a perfect reflection (Calderón, 2009). One solution to give a better 
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reflection is to make a combination variable where more variables are included, but as 
infrastructure only is a control variable mobile phone subscriptions are used while being 
aware of its drawbacks. The expected sign is positive. 
FDI and its connection to economic growth has been discussed earlier in the thesis. It is 
highly debated as a variable explaining economic growth but there are economists who have 
found support for it to have a significant positive effect on economic growth (Blomstrom et 
al. 1994 and Nair-Reichert & Weinhold, 2001). The expected sign is positive. 
5.1.2 Corruption variables 
Corruption is not easily measured, mainly because it includes illegal activities which are 
observed through criminal investigations or scandals. Successful corruption, in the meaning of 
not getting caught, will not be captured in these surveys. The definition of corruption is also 
creates a problem, as the definition is very broad the measuring of corruption would have to 
cover many different aspects. Additionally, the indexes are created by international agencies 
and tend to have a cultural bias in the way they are formulated as they are based on western 
norms and values. Differences in political and social structures makes comparisons between 
countries hard, an aspect that often is overlooked. (Andersson and Heywood, 2009.) 
The halo effect has also been discussed as an obstacle of measuring corruption. The halo 
effect is a phenomenon that causes individuals to assume that because a person is good at 
doing activity A, this person will also be good at doing activity B and C (Collins, 2009). 
Related to corruption it has been argued that the measuring of corruption can be influenced by 
recent economic performance, where fast-growing and rich countries rank better as they 
appear less corrupt (Kaufmann et. al. 2007). 
Different methods have been used to measure the level of corruption within countries. As this 
thesis aims to examine the effects of corruption two different indexes of corruption are used to 
make conclusions more accurate. The indexes used are the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Worldwide Governance Indicator’s measurement 
of corruption (WGI), where the CPI is the most reputable and frequently used index. Both 
variables are expected to have a negative sign. 
5.1.2.1 TI’s Corruption Perception Index 
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) was created in 1995 by the organization Transparency 
International (TI). The index measure relative corruption and is ranking countries around the 
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world on a scale from 0 to 101 based on how corrupt their public and political sector is 
perceived to be, where 0 is highly corrupt and 10 indicates very little corruption. The CPI is 
focused on the public sector, such as administrative and political corruption, and does not 
reflect the levels of corruption in the private sector or in the entire country. The index is based 
on empirical data, such as polls, reported cases of corruption, and reports from other 
institutions, but it also reflects the views of international analysts and experts living and 
working in the evaluated countries, thus measures perceived and not actual corruption. (TI, 
2014). 
There are a few bigger problems with the CPI that makes comparisons hard, the first one 
being that it is based on perceptions. If a sector is perceived to be highly corrupt agents who 
want to operate in that sector is more likely to engage in corruption activities themselves, 
creating a negative chain reaction. It is also important to be aware of whose perceptions that 
are being measured. The CPI is mainly aimed at western business leaders and thus often use 
perceptions of western business leaders, this can be a problem as many business leaders come 
across bribery. Perceptions of corruption that primarily reflect views and experience with 
bribery will not capture the level of corruption as a whole in an efficient way. Perceptions can 
also be influenced a lot by looking at similar research or results from other years, thus, if a 
country ranks high one year it is more likely to rank high the next year too. (Andersson and 
Heywood 2009.) 
The CPI is a composite index and uses surveys from different institutions. Each institution has 
their own understanding of corruption and sometimes even different definitions of corruption. 
In most surveys a panel of experts is asked to rank corruption, but the perceptions of these 
experts may differ: what seems like low corruption to one person could appear to be moderate 
or even high corruption to another. (Andersson and Heywood 2009.) 
Assuming that the index estimates the corruption level correctly, the last big problem is that 
one country’s ranking one year cannot be compared to another year as the ranking not only is 
based on that country’s score but also on how many countries that are measured that year. A 
country with the same score two years might not rank the same both years, also a small 
change between years, e.g. a difference from 3.4 to 3.2, could lead to a big drop in the ranking 
                                                          
1 As of 2012 the scale is changed to 0 to 100 and the method to create the index is changed so comparisons over 
time is possible even over shorter periods (TI, 2014). The 2012 data in this thesis has been transformed to the old 
scale. 
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even though it might not have changed that much in the country as a whole, but making 
people perceive it as much more corrupt (Andersson and Heywood 2009). 
5.1.2.2 Worldwide Governance Indicator’s measurement of corruption 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) report 6 different dimensions of governance. 
The dimensions measured are; voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
The WGI is composed with information from different sources reporting the views and 
experiences of citizens, business people, and experts in the public, private, and NGO sectors 
regarding the quality of different aspects of governance. Control of corruption is presented in 
a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 where more corrupt countries have a lower score than countries that 
are less corrupt (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014). 
The scores are hard to compare on a year to year basis and the index is better suited for 
research over longer periods of time where it has been able to show significant trends. 
Changes in a country’s score depend on different factors, except for actually improving or 
getting worse the biggest factor is changes in the underlying data material. A key aspect of the 
WGI is that all scores are accompanied with standard errors which can be thought of as a 
confidence interval where if they overlaps, the change from one year to another or between 
countries does not have statistically significant meaning. (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
2014.) 
Over recent years the WGI has become more frequently used by a wide range of people from 
policy makers to academics. It is considered being a useful tool mainly because the broad 
coverage and the many different data sources, but it has also been criticized. The corruption 
indicator has especially been discussed as the number of covered countries has increased a lot, 
from 152 countries 1996 to 204 countries 2005. Adding new countries to the index can 
change the ranks of the existing countries. A second critique is that the sources are biased 
towards the views of western business people as several data sources comes from commercial 
risk rating agencies with a cliental mainly consisting of business people. (Kaufmann et. al. 
2007.) 
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5.2 The data 
The data used in this thesis is secondary data collected from reputable sources for 50 
developing countries over 12 years of time (2001-2012), creating a balanced panel. The 
selection of developing countries comes from the World Bank classification of low to middle 
income countries.2 
Table 1. Description of data 
Economic growth GDP growth based on US dollar, presented in percent. The dependent variable in 
the regression analysis. The data is collected from the World Bank. 
FDI Net inflow of FDI presented in US dollar. Natural logarithms are used to make 
the variable more linear so it can be used in the regressions. The data is collected 
from the World Bank. 
Initial GDP per capita Presented in US dollar. Natural logarithms are used to make the variable more 
linear so it can be used in the regressions. The data is collected from the World 
Bank. 
Population growth Population growth presented in percent. The data is collected from the World 
Bank 
Savings and investments Gross savings calculated as gross national income minus total consumption plus 
net transfers, presented in dollar. Natural logarithms are used to make the variable 
more linear so it can be used in the regressions. The data is collected from the 
World Bank. 
Inflation Presented as percentage change in the consumer price index and reflects the 
annual percentage change in the cost of the average basket of goods and services. 
The data is collected from the World Bank. 
Secondary school 
enrollment 
Gross enrollment ratio in secondary school expressed as percentage of the 
population. It can exceed 100% due to early or late school entrance and grade 
repetition. The data is collected from the World Bank. 
Openness to trade The measurement of openness used is the Heritage Foundation’s measurement of 
freedom to trade, a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 is completely closed and 100 
completely open without restrictions. 
Mobile phone users The amount of mobile phone subscriptions to a public phone service per 100 
people. The data is collected from the World Bank. 
Corruption CPI Measured on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates highly corrupt and 10 
indicates absence of corruption. The data is collected from Transparency 
International. 
Corruption WGI Measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 where -2.5 indicates highly corrupt and 2.5 
indicated absence of corruption. The data is collected from the World Bank. 
                                                          
2 See appendix 1 for list of covered countries. 
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5.3 The model 
What we get with these variables are the following model: 
Ygrit = β1 + β2lnfdiit + β3lnycapit + β4pgrit + β5lnsiit + 
β6inflit + β7secsit + β8openit + β9mobit + β10corrit + Ɛit 
Where table 2 explains the denotations, i and t stand for country respectively time period. 
Table 2: Denotations of variables 
Ygr Economic growth 
lnfdi Received FDI 
lnycap Initial GDP per capita 
pgr Population growth 
lnsi Savings and investments 
infl Inflation 
secs Secondary school enrollment 
open Degree of trade openness 
mob Mobile phone users 
corr Corruption level 
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6. Results 
For information regarding statistics and econometrics in this chapter the book Introduction to 
Econometrics by Dougherty (2011) is used. 
6.1 Exploring relationships: Correlation 
6.1.1 FDI and economic growth 
Graph 2. Correlation between GDP growth and received FDI 
The relationship between 
FDI and economic growth 
can start being examined by 
looking at the correlation. 
Graph 3 shows a scatterplot 
with the correlation between 
GDP growth and received 
FDI for every year and 
country. The fitted values 
and a 95% confidence 
interval are also being 
shown. By looking at the graph a small positive correlation can be seen, when the coefficient 
is being calculated it is confirmed to be 0.183 which is relatively low in the meaning that it is 
hard to predict the movement of economic growth only by looking at amount of received FDI. 
6.1.2 Corruption and FDI 
Graph 3 and 4 shows scatterplots with the correlation between received FDI and the level of 
corruption for every year and country, graph 4 using CPI and graph 5 using WGI. The fitted 
values and a 95% confidence interval are also being shown. By looking at the graphs a small 
positive correlation can be seen, when the coefficients are being calculated it is confirmed to 
be 0.170 when using CPI and 0.122 when using WGI 
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Graph 3 and 4: Correlation between received FDI and level of corruption 
 
It is important to notice that higher levels of corruption is represented with a higher rank on 
the scales. The correlation between FDI and both corruption variables are relatively low 
which suggest a weak relationship and no analytical interpretations should be made. 
6.2 OLS regression analysis 
Correlation indicates that two variables can have some sort of relationship, but it does not 
control for other variables and has only a small analytical value. Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
is a method used to estimate unknown parameters in a linear regression model and can be 
used to examine relationships between variables further. Normal OLS estimation is possible 
when working with panel data. 
As 2001-2012 is a period of time with a quite unstable world economy with several economic 
crises it is fair to assume that there will be time specific effects affecting the results. To avoid 
that effects from business cycles affect the results the data is divided into 3 time periods 
(2001-2004, 2005-2008, 2009-2012) where the mean value for every variable that time period 
will be used instead of using data for each year. Robust standard errors are used because of 
heteroscedasticity3,4. 
Specification of model: 
Ygrit = β1 + β2lnfdiit + β3lnycapit + β4pgrit + β5lnsiit + 
β6inflit + β7secsit + β8openit + β9mobit + Ɛit 
                                                          
3 See appendix 3 for descriptive statistics and robustness tests. 
4 (*) = significant on a 10% level, (**) = significant on a 5% level, (***) significant on a 1% level 
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Table 3. Regression 1, 2, 3, and 4: Economic growth depending on different variables 
Dependent variable Economic gr. (1) Economic gr. (2) Economic gr. (3) Economic gr. (4) 
Observations / R2 148 0.049 144 0.251 125 0.273 125 0.305 
Independent variables Coefficient/Std. Err Coefficient/Std. Err Coefficient/Std. Err Coefficient/Std. Err 
Intercept (β1) -2.946 2.600 -8.631 
(***) 
3.015 -10.258 
(***) 
3.522 -13.000 
(***) 
4.557 
FDI 0.373 
(***) 
0.127 0.395 
(***) 
0.105 0.389 
(***) 
0.118 0.473 
(***) 
0.130 
Initial GDP per capita   -0.599 
(***) 
0.196 -0.699 
(**) 
0.288 -0.491 
(*) 
0.275 
Population growth   0.210 0.256 0.341 0.290 0.372 0.275 
Savings & investments   3.114 
(***) 
0.875 3.230 
(***)  
1.019 3.023 
(***) 
1.080 
Inflation     0.085 0.062 0.068 0.060 
Sec. school enrollment     0.020 0.020 0.024 0.192 
Openness       0.012 0.024 
Mobile phone users       -0.018 
(**) 
0.009 
 
Table 4: Interpretation of coefficients 1 
β1 Intercept 
β2 Marginal effect of lnfdi 
β3 Marginal effect of lnycap 
β4 Marginal effect of pgr 
β5 Marginal effect of lnsi 
β6 Marginal effect of infl 
β7 Marginal effect of secs 
β8 Marginal effect of open 
β9 Marginal effect of mob 
 
Worth noticing in table 3 is that FDI has a significant positive effect on economic growth in 
all regressions. When initial GDP per capita is added it has a significant negative effect on 
economic growth while savings and investments have a significant positive effect on 
economic growth. As of regression 2 the intercept is also significant. In regression 4 the 
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infrastructure variable shows a significant negative effect on economic growth. Population 
growth, secondary school enrollment, level of openness, and inflation are all insignificant. 
The R2-value indicates how well the data fit the model, in regression 4 the variables captures 
30.5%. 
6.2.1 OLS estimation with an interaction variable 
To examine if corruption has an effect on economic growth and if there is an interaction affect 
between FDI and corruption an interaction variable is needed in the model. Interaction 
variables can lead to a higher understanding of the variables relationships. 
The following regressions are done to examine the effects of corruption. 
Specification of model: 
Ygrit = β1 + β2lnfdiit + β3lnycapit + β4pgrit + β5lnsiit + 
β6inflit + β7secsit + β8openit + β9mobit + β10corrit + 
β11lnfdi*corrit + Ɛit 
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Table 5. Regression 5, 6, 7, and 8: Effects of corruption5 
Dependent variable Economic gr. (5) 
(using CPI) 
Economic gr. (6) 
(using WGI) 
Economic gr. (7) 
(using CPI) 
Economic gr (8) 
(using WGI) 
Observations / R2 125 0.308 125 0.309 125 0.314 125 0.312 
Independent variables Coefficient/Std Err Coefficient/Std Err Coefficient/Std Err Coefficient/Std Err 
Intercept (β1) -12.570 
(***) 
4.220 -13.321 
(***) 
4.829 -24.583 
(**) 
10.845 -10.108 
(**) 
4.738 
FDI 0.460 
(***) 
0.134 0.452 
(***) 
0.136 1.072 
(**) 
0.470 0.354 
(***) 
0.134 
Initial GDP per 
capita 
-0.398 0.398 -0.380 0.280 -0.455 0.283 -0.468 0.292 
Population growth 0.384 0.283 0.381 0.282 0.399 0.288 0.387 0.287 
Savings & 
investments 
2.977 
(***) 
2.977 2.968 
(***) 
1.029 2.802 
(***) 
0.997 2.704 
(***) 
1.028 
Inflation 0.059 0.055 0.060 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.055 0.054 
Sec. school 
enrollment 
0.059 0.020 0.023 0.020 0.025 0.020 0.023 0.020 
Openness 0.012 0.024 0.011 0.024 0.015 0.025 0.012 0.024 
Mobile phone users -0.019 
(**) 
0.009 -0.020 
(**) 
0.009 -0.019 
(**) 
0.009 -0.020 
(**) 
0.010 
CPI or WGI -0.199 0.319 -0.415 0.665 3.353 2.335 7.624 4.736 
FDICPI or FDIWGI     -0.170 0.118 -0.383 0.234 
 
Table 6. Interpretation of coefficients 2 
Regression 5 and 6 
β1- β9 See table 2 
β10 Marginal effect of corruption 
Regression 7 and 8 
β1, β3- β9 See table 2 
β2 Marginal effect of FDI when corruption=0 
β10 Marginal effect of CPI/WGI when FDI=0 
β10 + β11 • lnfdi Marginal effect of corruption 
β2 + β11 • corr Marginal effect of FDI 
                                                          
5 P-values: Regression 5: CPI 0.533, Regression 6: WGI: 0.528, Regression 7: CPI 0.154, 
CPI*FDI 0.153, Regression 8: WGI 0.110, WGI*FDI 0.105 
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Adding the corruption variable and the interaction variable changes the estimates but the 
variables keep the same signs, initial GDP per capita is however no longer significant. The 
corruption coefficients have expected signs but are not significant on a 10% significance 
level. As the study however only covers developing countries higher significance levels can 
be argued to be tolerated. As the coefficients all ranges below a 15.5% significance level the 
relationship between corruption and FDI towards economic growth can be interpreted by 
looking at the marginal effects in table 7 and 8.6 
Table 7. Marginal effect of corruption 1 
Using CPI 
Minimum value of lnFDI 3.353 + (-0.170 • 16.823) = 0.493 
Mean value of lnFDI 3.353 + (-0.170 • 21.151) = -0.243 
Maximum value of lnFDI 3.353 + (-0.170 • 26.100) = -1.084 
Using WGI 
Minimum value of lnFDI 7.624 + (-0.383 • 16.823) = 1.181 
Mean value of lnFDI 7.624 + (-0.383 • 21.151) = -0.477 
Maximum value of lnFDI 7.624 + (-0.383 • 26.100) = -2.372 
Table 8. Marginal effect of FDI 1 
Using CPI 
Minimum value of CPI 1.072 + (-0.170 • 1.1) = 0.885 
Mean value of CPI 1.072 + (-0.170 • 3.246) = 0.520 
Maximum value of CPI 1.072 + (-0.170 • 6.025) = 0.048 
Using WGI 
Minimum value of WGI 0.354 + (-0.383 • (-1.272)) = 0.841 
Mean value of WGI 0.354 + (-0.383 • (-0.441)) = 0.523 
Maximum value of WGI 0.354 + (-0.383 • (0.992)) = -0.026 
 
The marginal effects of corruption show that with the minimum level of FDI inflow 
corruption has a positive effect on economic growth, but with the mean and maximum levels 
of FDI inflow corruption affect economic growth negatively. The marginal effects of FDI 
show that the higher level of corruption the less FDI affect economic growth positively, and 
with maximum level of corruption using WGI the effect on economic growth is negative. 
                                                          
6 See appendix 2 for minimum, mean, and maximum values of FDI and corruption. 
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6.3 Fixed effect regression analysis 
Although OLS estimation works to some extent, it does not use all available information from 
the panel data. It is possible that there are country specific effects that needs to be taken into 
consideration, and thus OLS estimation, which implies that all countries are the same, will not 
be an efficient method. If there are individual effects that are not being taken into 
consideration this could also lead to lower R2-values. There are two methods that take into 
account for individual effects, fixed effect or random effect panel regressions. With fixed 
effect the assumption is that the individual effect is a different constant for every country 
which is calculated by adding a dummy variable for every country, while random effect 
assumes that the individual effect is a drawing from a random variable. Random effect does 
generally give better β-estimations as all information in the panel is being used only for this, 
the individual effect is thought of as part of the error term. It is however not reasonable to 
think that the country specific effect is a drawing from a random variable, it would more 
likely reflect specific conditions within the country and thus fixed effects will be used. 
Another advantage with the fixed effect regression is that it is controlling for the average 
differences across countries and the differences within the same country are being admitted. 
This greatly reduces the problem with biased estimations due to omitted variables. 
Specification of model: 
Ygrit = β2lnfdiit + β3lnycapit + β4pgrit + β5lnsiit + β6inflit + 
β7secsit + β8openit + β9mobit + β10corrit + β11lnfdi*corrit + 
β12co1t + β13co2t + … + β61co50t + Ɛit 
 
One dummy variable is added for each country to be able to calculate the individual 
intercepts, the dummies are denoted co for country plus a number 1-50 specifying which one. 
The coefficients are interpreted as marginal effects the same way as for normal OLS 
estimation. 
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Table 9. Regression 9 and 10: Effects of corruption using CPI (Fixed effect)7 
Dependent variable Economic gr. (9) Economic gr. (10) 
Observations / groups 125 46 125 46 
R2 within 0.392 0.397 
Independent variables Coefficient/Std Err Coefficient/Std Err 
Intercept (β1) -9.490 10.735 -25.485 23.539 
FDI 2.214 
(***) 
0.494 3.053 
(**) 
1.205 
Initial GDP per capita -4.857 
(***) 
1.720 -5.025 
(***) 
1.739 
Population growth -2.776 
(**) 
1.307 -2.838 
(**) 
1.313 
Savings & investments 3.322 
(***) 
1.229 3.282 
(***) 
1.234 
Inflation -0.020 0.066 -0.038 0.070 
Sec. school enrollment 0.037 0.050 0.036 0.050 
Openness -0.005 0.049 0.005 0.052 
Mobile phone users -0.001 0.015 -0.002 0.015 
CPI -1.041 0.932 3.559 6.092 
FDI*CPI   -0.228 0.298 
 
Table 10. Marginal effect of corruption 2 
Minimum value of lnFDI 3.559 + (-0.228 • 16.823) = -0.277 
Mean value of lnFDI 3.559 + (-0.228 • 21.151) = -1.263 
Maximum value of lnFDI 3.559 + (-0.228 • 26.100) = -2.392 
 
Table 11. Marginal effect of FDI 2 
Minimum value of CPI 3.053 + (-0.228 • 1.1) = 2.802 
Mean value of CPI 3.053 + (-0.228 • 3.246) = 2.313 
Maximum value of CPI 3.053 + (-0.228 • 6.025) = 1.679 
  
                                                          
7 P-values: Regression 9: CPI 0.268, Regression 10: CPI 0.561, CPI*FDI 0.447 
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Table 12. Regression 11 and 12: Effects of corruption using WGI (Fixed effect)8 
Dependent variable Economic gr. (11) Economic gr. (12) 
Observations / groups 125 46 125 46 
R2 within 0.396 0.402 
Independent variables Coefficient/Sta Err Coefficient/Std Err 
Intercept (β1) -4.187 11.132 -0.102 12.240 
FDI 2.061 
(***) 
0.496 2.040 
(***) 
0.498 
Initial GDP per capita -5.518 
(***) 
1.685 -6.022 
(***) 
1.800 
Population growth -2.649 
(**) 
1.300 -2.754 
(**) 
1.309 
Savings & investments 2.774 
(**) 
1.252 2.702 
(**) 
1.258 
Inflation 0.021 0.067 0.001 0.071 
Sec. school enrollment 0.050 0.051 0.049 0.052 
Openness 0.006 0.050 0.015 0.051 
Mobile phone users 0.004 0.015 0.005 0.015 
WGI 3.112 2.346 14.016 13.622 
FDI*WGI   -0.532 0.654 
 
Table 13. Marginal effect of corruption 3 
Minimum value of lnFDI 14.016 + (-0.532 • 16.823) = 5.066 
Mean value of lnFDI 14.016 + (-0.532 • 21.151) = 2.764 
Maximum value of lnFDI 14.016 + (-0.532 • 26.100) = 0.131 
 
Table 14. Marginal effect of FDI 3 
Minimum value of WGI 2.040 + (-0.532 • (-1.272)) = 2.717 
Mean value of WGI 2.040 + (-0.532 • (-0.441)) = 2.275 
Maximum value of WGI 2.040 + (-0.532 • 0.992) = 1.512 
 
 
                                                          
8 P-values: Regression 11: WGI 0.189, Regression 12: WGI 0.307, WGI*FDI 0.419 
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The intercepts in the regressions are the average value of the individual intercepts. The fixed 
effect analysis produce a R2-value called R2 within which is interesting as it shows the fit of 
the model like an OLS but with the transformed data. The within R2-values from all fixed 
effect regressions is higher than the R2-values from the normal OLS regression in previous 
section which strongly implies that there are a country specific effects to take into 
consideration. 
Using fixed effect regressions FDI and savings and investments have a significant positive 
effect on economic growth, consistent with previous results, while initial GDP per capita and 
population growth has a significant negative effect on economic growth. Inflation, secondary 
school enrollment, level of openness, and mobile phone users have no significant effect on 
economic growth. 
Corruption shows no significant effect on economic growth alone or interacted with FDI, and 
the p-values are much higher in the fixed effect regressions than in the OLS regressions which 
gives interpretations of the marginal effects little analytical value, still however valuable in 
for this thesis. 
Table 11, 12, 13, and 14 shows the relationship between corruption and FDI towards 
economic growth. Using CPI corruption always has a negative effect on economic growth, 
and the higher levels of FDI inflow the more negative corruption is for economic growth. 
Using WGI corruption affect economic growth positively, but the higher the levels of FDI 
inflow the smaller the effect. The marginal effect of FDI is always positive no matter what 
corruption measurement that is used and also shows that the higher the level of corruption is 
the less of a positive effect FDI has on economic growth. 
 
7. Conclusions 
7.1 Discussion 
Population growth, secondary school enrollment, and level of openness all show expected 
sign in the OLS regressions but are insignificant. Inflation would be expected to have a 
negative effect on economic growth but has a positive sign, but as it is not significant it 
should not be interpreted too carefully. 
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In the OLS regressions infrastructure has a significant negative effect on economic growth, 
which is unexpected. It could depend on the fact that mobile phones per 100 people is not an 
optimal tool to use and does not reflect the infrastructure development in this selection of 
countries, and also on the fact that the selection of countries is just developing countries in 
many different stages of development. In the fixed effect regressions infrastructure is however 
no longer significant and as the fixed effect regressions are the better suited for this research 
the subject can be dismissed. 
Initial GDP per capita becomes less significant the more variables that are added in the OLS 
analysis, in the regressions where corruption is added it is no longer significant but has still 
expected sign. In the fixed effect regressions the variable is significant again and has expected 
negative effect on economic growth. As the fixed effect regressions are better suited for this 
research and the effect is supported by theory it can be considered to increase the model’s 
credibility. 
That population growth has a significant negative effect on economic growth in the fixed 
effect regressions can be explained by the selection of examined developing countries where 
the conditions within the countries might not be optimal for a growing population. 
Savings and investments have a significant positive effect on economic growth in all 
regressions, which also is supported by theory and can be considered to increase the model’s 
credibility. FDI has a significant positive effect on economic growth in all regressions. 
The interaction between FDI and corruption has not shown any significant results on a 10% 
significance level. It is however still interesting to discuss a possible cause for the 
relationships as the trends were the same in the OLS regressions and the fixed effect 
regressions. Corruption is more negative for economic growth as FDI inflows increase. One 
explanation could be that with low levels of FDI corruption could make processes quicker for 
companies to start operating and not be completely negative for economic growth, but as FDI 
inflows increase the effect subsides. As for FDI being less positive for economic growth as 
corruption increases, the relationship seems rather logical. For instance, an foreign investor 
who has to pay high bribes to access markets or get permits will have less resources to operate 
and thus smaller chances of succeeding and contributing to economic growth than a foreign 
investor who does not have to pay bribes. 
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7.2 Conclusions 
The aim for this thesis was to examine if FDI have a positive effect on economic growth in 
developing countries and to see if an interaction between FDI and corruption affect economic 
growth. The subject is currently important as the understanding of institutional affects could 
help governments worldwide to create better conditions for economic growth and 
development. 
The results show that FDI have a significant positive effect on economic growth, which 
strengthens the results from Blomstrom et al. (1994) and Nair-Reichert & Weinhold (2001) 
who also concluded that FDI has a positive effect on economic growth. The additional 
contribution from this study is the big selection of developing countries. As the selection of 
countries in this thesis is very diverse, both considering income levels and geographic 
location, the conclusions can be argued to represent developing countries in general.  
Regarding the interaction between FDI and corruption no significant results regarding its 
effect on economic growth could be found, it is however not the same as concluding that the 
interaction does not exist. Additionally a higher significance level can be argued to be 
tolerated regarding developing countries, whereas the trends found are highly interesting and 
should be examined further. That no results could be found on a lower significance level 
could be due to weaknesses in the way corruption is measured, but also the fact that the 
covered countries are very different could be contributing. Developing countries are often 
harder to have general conclusions about as conditions within them often differ a lot which 
makes results harder to interpret. 
7.3 Future research 
Theory and other studies have concluded that institutional settings within a country are 
important for creating a good climate of development, which suggests that institutional 
settings within countries does matter for FDI inflows and the magnitude of its effects on 
economic growth. It is interesting and valuable to know exactly how these are connected and 
more research within this area is necessary. Developing countries often lack data which 
makes research harder, more accurate studies on institutional effects on FDI and economic 
growth will be able to be carried through as more data is collected. 
It would be interesting to develop this study and examine countries divided into smaller 
groups after characteristics such as income level, geographic location, or demographic 
conditions. This could enable for more certain conclusions about the interaction between FDI 
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and corruption to be made, and to see if the interaction effect can be found on lower 
significance levels depending on surrounding conditions. 
Another way to develop this study could be to divide FDI in different ways to see if one type 
of FDI is more affected by levels of corruption than other. A possible grouping could be more 
integrated FDI targeting domestic markets and FDI focusing on export. 
The weaknesses in the ways corruption is measured is the biggest obstacle for this type of 
research. For all future research on corruption it would be preferable to use both CPI and WGI 
as it would lead to more certain conclusions. 
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Appendix 1. Countries covered in the study 
Table 15 is showing the countries covered in the study. The countries were selected by 
looking at income level were low to middle income countries were chosen, used were the 
World Banks classifications of low to middle income level. The selection were further limited 
to which countries the CPI and WGI covered in their indexes. 
Zimbabwe is classified as a low income country by the World Bank but is not covered in the 
study although corruption data was available. Conditions within the country, such as 
hyperinflation, makes Zimbabwe less suited to be part of the study. The analytical value were 
further reduced as data over other variables also were missing. 
Table 15. Countries covered in the study 
Argentina Malawi 
Azerbaijan Malaysia 
Bangladesh Mauritius 
Bolivia Mexico 
Botswana Moldova 
Brazil Namibia 
Bulgaria Nicaragua 
Cameroon Nigeria 
China Pakistan 
Colombia Panama 
Costa Rica Peru 
Côte d´Ivoire Philippines 
Dominican Rep Romania 
Ecuador Senegal 
Egypt South Africa 
El Salvador Tanzania 
Ghana Thailand 
Guatemala Tunisia 
Honduras Turkey 
Hungary Uganda 
India  Ukraine 
Indonesia Uzbekistan 
Jordan Venezuela 
Kazakhstan Vietnam 
Kenya Zambia 
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Appendix 2 Descriptive statistics and robustness tests of data 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perYgr 150 4.893 2.908 -1.410 24.180 
lnfdi 148 21.151 1.712 16.823 26.100 
lnycap 150 7.592 1.232 2.271 9.467 
perpgr 150 1.457 0.962 -1.220 3.374 
lnsi 146 3.023 0.378 0.472 3.945 
infl 145 7.389 5.059 -0.472 33.812 
secs 132 71.162 21.987 18.020 104.508 
open 150 68.496 11.451 23.5 87.275 
mob 150 53.957 40.197 1.018 176.646 
cpi 150 3.246 0.992 1.1 6.025 
wgi 150 -0.441 0.513 -1.272 0.992 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
One of the main assumption for the ordinary least square (OLS) regression to be efficient is 
constant variance of the residuals, when this is not the case the residuals are heteroscedastic. 
If the residuals are heteroscedastic the OLS estimators are inefficient, the standard errors of 
the regression will be incorrect (Dougherty p. 283, 2011). To see if the data is heteroscedastic 
a Breush-Pagan test of following regression is done: 
Model specification: 
Ygrit = β1 + β2lnfdiit + β3lnycapit + β4pgrit + β5lnsiit + 
β6inflit + β7secsit + β8openit + β9mobit + β10cpiit + β11wgiit + 
Ɛit 
 
 
As the P-value is very small the hypothesis is rejected, the variance is heteroscedastic. In the 
regressions in this thesis robust standard errors are used to correct the estimations. 
H0: Constant variance of residuals 
P-value: 0.000 
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Multicollinearity 
Perfect linear relationships among variables in a regression, multicollinearity, creates a 
problem when estimating the coefficients and their standard errors, the coefficients become 
unstable and appear to be highly significant (Dougherty p. 165, 2011). Doing a variance 
inflation factor (VIF) test on the variables (one regression for each measure of corruption) 
following results are shown: 
Table 17: Results from the VIF-tests 
A thumb rule is that variables with a VIF-
value lower than 10 and a tolerance level, 
defined as 1/VIF, higher than 0.1 are okay 
and should not cause a problem (Kennedy p. 
199, 2008). As this is the case no further 
investigation is needed regarding 
multicollinearity. 
 
 
 
 
Autocorrelation 
As panel data is used and there is data over time there is a possibility for autocorrelation. A 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data is done: 
 
 
Whereas the high P-value means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, meaning that 
there is no autocorrelation in the data. 
Causality 
Theory supports that the independent variables affect the dependent variable, it is however 
also reasonable to think that GDP growth affects some of the independent variables. Canning 
and Pedroni (2004) found a bi-directional relationship between GDP growth and 
infrastructure, where infrastructure development affects GDP growth but also that GDP 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ycap 2.68 0.373 ycap 2.82 0.355 
secs 2.51 0.399 secs 2.49 0.401 
mob 2.27 0.440 mob 2.38 0.419 
perpgr 1.69 0.593 perpgr 1.69 0.593 
lnfdi 1.63 0.614 lnfdi 1.66 0.603 
open 1.58 0.633 open 1.58 0.633 
cpi 1.47 0.679 wgi 1.48 0.676 
lnsi 1.26 0.795 lnsi 1.26 0.794 
infl 1.12 0.896 infl 1.10 0.908 
mean VIF 1.80 mean VIF 1.83 
H0: no autocorrelation 
P-value: 0.507 
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growth affects infrastructure development. Madsen (2002) concluded that economic growth is 
determined by a country’s savings and investment rate, but also that certain investments are 
caused by economic growth. This causality loop between the independent and dependent 
variables can lead to endogeneity. The problem with endogeneity is that if an endogenous, or 
an omitted, variable, thus a variable that is determined by other variables in the system, is 
correlated with the error term the coefficients in an OLS regression become biased and the 
method is no longer efficient. The solution for the problem is to use another variable as a tool. 
In the case of FDI a significant endogenous relationship between it and economic growth has 
been identified in several studies since the mid 1980’s (Xiaoying and Xiaming, 2005). If the 
model is subject to endogeneity the estimated coefficients will be biased, the problem in this 
case is that there are no ideal tool available to solve the problem. A second solution is to use 
fixed effect regressions which greatly reduce this risk. 
